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PROBATION RESTRICTIONS IMPACTING
THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE: THE
OAKLEY ERROR
JENNIFER LEVI*

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Oakley, 1 the all-male four-justice 2 majority held that
a probation condition restricting David Oakley's right to have chil
dren passed constitutional muster. Writing for the all-female,
three-justice dissent, Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court sounded a clarion call that the decision made theirs "the only
court in the country"3 to uphold such limits on a probationer's right
to procreate. She is nearly correct in her conclusion. Only one
other reported decision,4 another case involving a male defendant's
right to procreate, affirms a probation condition limiting a proba
tioner's right to have children. 5 Every other reported decision re
viewing a restriction on a probationer's right to have children,
primarily involving female probationers, has struck down the
condition. 6
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I
wish to thank Professors Richard Cole, Bruce Miller, James Gordon, Valorie Vojdik,
Jaminson Colburn, Samuel Stonefield, Leora Harpaz, Taylor Flynn, and Dean Arthur
Gaudio for review or discussion of this essay. I also wish to thank the Western New
England Law Review staff for assistance with editing and cite-checking.
1. 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
2. While arguably not always relevant, the gendered composition of the majority
and dissent bears mention in light of the gender-based analysis herein.
3. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216.
4. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (after violating his proba
tion for criminal mistreatment of a child, the defendant was prohibited from fathering
more children until he completed counseling).
5. Two other decisions affirm a less strict restriction relating to procreation. See
State v. Talty, 2003 WL 21396835, at *2, 7-9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 2003) (citing
Oakley) (upholding (community control condition that defendant convicted of non-sup
port of dependents take reasonable steps to avoid conceiving another child); Krebs v.
Schwartz, 568 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (probation condition requiring proba
tioner "to discuss and obtain permission from probation agent" before beginning sexual
relationship was held constitutional).
6. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (hold
ing "no pregnancy condition ... improper because it is impermissibly overbroad.");
People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the existence of
81
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Concerned about this departure from the national majority po
sition, Justice Bradley criticizes the majority for its application of a
reasonableness test to the probation condition and advocates vocif
erously for heightened scrutiny of probation conditions that im
pinge on fundamental rights.7 Based on a review of the analysis in
comparable cases across the country, her focus is misplaced. De
spite Oakley's departure in outcome from the dominant national
trend, the majority's analysis is all but doctrinally routine with re
spect to the degree of scrutiny it affords the probation condition.
Academics may argue about the right standard for evaluating
the constitutionality of probation conditions as a normative matter. 8
However, there is little question about the standard that courts do
apply in reviewing restrictions on liberty interests of probationers.
As articulated by the Oakley majority, "conditions of probation
may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not
overly broad and are reasonably related to the person's rehabilita
tion."9 In other words, while generally there must be a rational re
lationship between the restriction and the underlying criminal act,
there is less scrutiny of the restriction of a liberty interest for a pro
bationer than there is for a non-probationer.I o This is in recogni
tion of the fact that if the probationer were not on probation he or
"alternative restrictions less subversive of appellant's fundamental right to procreate.");
Trammel v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (order to refrain from be
coming pregnant held to serve "no rehabilitative purpose whatsoever.").
7. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 217.
8. See generally Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two
Steps Back?, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 166 (1993) (advocating for strict scrutiny
analysis of probation condition mandating use of long-term contraception that sup
presses ovulation in light of its promise "to have a severely disparate impact on women
of color."); Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some
Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 75, 161 (2000) (advocating for appellate courts to "abandon the incredibly defer
ential abuse of discretion standard ...."); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day
Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1357, 1359 (1989) (reasoning that "punitive probation conditions" should merit "an
eighth amendment analysis."); Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology
of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scar
let Letter Probation Conditions,77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 786 (1999) (proposing "a standard
that requires the trial courts to explain their reasons for imposing special probation
conditions and that requires reviewing courts to consider the probationer's liberty inter
est in their analysis of probate conditions."); Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, "Join the
Sierra Club!": Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of Probation, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1841, 1848 (1994) (suggesting "heightened constitutional scrutiny" for "probation con
ditions that impose an ideology ....").
9. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 210 (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (1976».
10. As the Oakley majority explained, "a convicted felon does not stand in the
same position as someone who has not been convicted of a crime." Id. at 210. In sup
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she would be incarcerated, a near total curtailment of the individ
ual's liberty interest.
This essay makes a modest point about the Oakley decision
which is simply the case's jurisprudential ordinariness. The major
ity accurately identifies the established test for evaluating the con
stitutionality of probation restrictions and applies it. In an
abundance of caution, the majority goes even further in analyzing
the constitutionality of the condition and supporting the outcome in
the case. In addition to applying the test it articulates as the con
trolling one, the majority also applies the heightened scrutiny test
supported by the dissent. Applying that test, the majority con
cludes that the "condition is narrowly tailored to serve the State's
compelling interest of having parents support their children."ll.
Recognizing that it is the court's ultimate duty to engage in
balancing, it is hard to fault the majority for the outcome. Despite
that cold conclusion, this author shares the dissent's concern about
the slippery slope created by the Oakley decision as well as the
challenges it creates for marginalized groups.l2 Nevertheless, this
author also acknowledges that slippery slopes can slope both ways
depending on the placement of the fulcrum.13 In other words, the
dissent is rightfully concerned that this decision allows courts to ef
fectively curtail the fundamental right of poor, convicted persons to
have children14 and, ultimately, threatens to make one's ability to
support one's children a limit on having additional children. 1s Of
port of this observation, the court explained, convicted felons may lawfully be deprived
their right to vote even after serving a full sentence. Id. at 210 n.26.
11. Id. at 212.
12. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
13. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1026, 1030 (2003) (remarking on cases "where the slope seems slippery both
ways . . . .").
14. This essay says little about the jurisprudence establishing the fundamental
right at issue, the right to have children, because it is so firmly established. See Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,536 (1942) (calling "the right to have
offspring" ... "a right ... basic to the perpetuation of a race ..."); Matter of Guardian
ship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 892 (Wis. 1981) (describing "the right to procreate"
as "a protected, fundamental personal decisional choice ...."). Other authors have
addressed the dissent's concern about the slippery slope to eradicating this right, partic
ularly in the context of welfare legislation. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth
Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional
Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473,474-86 (1995) (arguing Norplant welfare laws
infringe the constitutional right to procreate); Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine and Mandating Norplant for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 15, 22 (1994) (asserting that "[1]egislation that links Norplant to
welfare benefits infringes upon the protected fundamental rights of mothers.").
15. While there are some who might support this position as a policy matter, it

84

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:81

course, the slippery slope traversed in the other direction and its
effect on existing children is the majority's concern. The majority is
on record as emphatically rejecting, "the novel idea that Oakley has
an absolute right to refuse to support his current nine children and
any future children that he procreates ...."16 The majority sees
David Oakley's constitutional rights as appropriately infringed in
the interest of protecting children.
Notwithstanding the dissent's alarm over the ramifications of
the decision for every citizen of Wisconsin (and presumably every
citizen of this country), "man or woman, rich or poor,"17 in the end,
the majority opinion situates itself securely within established pro
bation jurisprudence. As a result, the case should either cause no
alarm or, in the alternative, should turn a spotlight on the incorrect
ness of courts' analytical approach to evaluating probation condi
tions rather than on the degree of scrutiny applied.
In order to advance some thinking on the question of the ap
propriate approach to evaluating the constitutionality of probation
conditions, Section I unpacks the disagreement (or lack of it) be
tween the majority and the dissent. This sets up the groundwork
for a discussion in Section II that compares the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's approach to that of other courts in cases involving, in some
way, decisions limiting a probationer's right to have children. Sec
tion II concludes that regardless of what constitutional standard or
degree of scrutiny courts apply, cases can (and do) go both ways
with respect to upholding or striking down probation restrictions on
fundamental rights. However, the dominant trend despite the
Oakley decision has been to strike down procreation restrictions.
Section III details an alternative approach to the evaluation of pro
bation conditions under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
that was revitalized in the 2001 Supreme Court term and argues
that, in the end, probationers should have at least the same protec
tions for constitutional rights as do incarcerated felons. Accord
ingly, no absolute curtailment of probationers' procreation rights,
which the Oakley restriction is, should survive constitutional
review.

clearly violates established constitutional law. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
388 (1978) (finding that inability to pay child support may not compromise fundamental
right).
16. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208.
17. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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THE MAJORITY AND DISSENT VEHEMENTLY DISAGREE-OR
Do THEY?

The rhetoric adopted by both the majority and dissent suggests
that they vehemently disagree with one another about the approach
to reviewing the probation condition at issue in the case. However,
a closer look at each side's analysis reveals that the more serious
disagreement is in the outcome, not in the approach.
A.

The Majority Approach

Justice Wilcox wrote the decision for the court. After detailing
the facts of the case, including Oakley's having nine children with
four different women and his subsequent refusal to provide support
for them,18 Justice Wilcox zeroes in on the constitutional issue. As
he articulates it, the issue is one of the constitutionality of a condi
tion of probation19 that prohibits Oakley from fathering any addi
tional children "unless he shows that he can support that child and
his current children. "20
Before addressing the constitutional standard for reviewing
probation conditions, Justice Wilcox cites the probation statute and
explains a justification for its use. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has said, "[t]he theory of the probation statute is to rehabilitate the
defendant and protect society without placing the defendant in
prison."21 Picking up on the two-part concern of the statute, reha
bilitation and protection of society, the majority focuses on the role
of the probation-issuing judge. "[W]hen a judge allows a convicted
individual to escape a prison sentence and enjoy the relative free
dom of probation, he or she must take reasonable judicial measures
to protect society and potential victims from future wrongdoing. "22
While such judges are admonished against imposing probation con
ditions that reflect the judge's personal idiosyncrasies,23 they should
use their discretion in order to set probation conditions that further
the dual purposes of the statute. This exercise of discretion ac
18. The facts of this case have been addressed in detail in other articles in this
Symposium and, while interesting, are not as relevant to this essay. See Taylor Flynn,
Introduction: What Does Oakley Tell Us About the Failures of Constitutional Decision
Making?, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2004); David Papke, State v. Oakley, Deadbeat
Dads, and American Poverty, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 9, 10-16 (2004).
19. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203 (stating the basis of Oakley's challenge).
20. Id. at 201.
21. Id. at 205 (citing State v. Gray, 590 N.W.2d 918, 933 (Wis. 1999».
22. Id. at 206.
23. Id. at 206 n.20 (citing Horwitz, supra note 8; Brilliant, supra note 8 (noting
some of the more bizarre probation conditions judges have imposed».
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know ledges an inconsistency of probation conditions that may be
imposed by different judges, even for probationers charged with
similar crimes based on comparable sets of facts.
Having laid the factual predicates for the case and identified
the legal issues, Justice Wilcox addresses Oakley's contention that
because the probation restriction impinges on the fundamental
right to procreate it warrants strict scrutiny.24 At this point, Justice
Wilcox's analysis takes an interesting turn that is somewhat hard to
follow. He concedes, as he must, that procreation is a fundamental
right and ordinarily its infringement by the government would be
subject to strict scrutiny.25 However, before distinguishing Oakley,
a convicted felon, from an ordinary person, as he does later in the
opinion,26 he grants Oakley his position and seems to apply strict
scrutiny by noting Oakley's concession that the State's interest in
requiring parents to support their children is a compelling oneP
Justice Wilcox then hones in on Oakley's argument which seems to
be that, although the government identifies a compelling interest in
support of the restriction, the condition is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored because it categorically denies Oakley the right to procre
ate. Oakley argues that the condition categorically denies him the
right to procreate because he "'probably never will have the ability
to support his children. "28
Interestingly, rather than returning to the rational relationship
standard Justice Wilcox later determines applicable, he instead con
cedes that "Oakley'S argument might well carry the day if he had
not intentionally refused to pay child support ...."29 What Justice
Wilcox seems to be saying is that the restriction is narrowly tailored
because it contains a safety valve - as soon as Oakley "decides"30 to
provide for his children, the procreation restriction may be lifted.
By engaging Oakley's argument, Justice Wilcox implies that strict
Id. at 207.
Id. (citing Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood County, 307 N.W.2d 881
(1981); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942».
26. Id. at 208 (citing State v. Evans, 252 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1977); Von Arx v.
Schwarz, 517 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994».
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The word here is in quotes to identify that it is the author's and not the
court's. There is a significant dispute between the majority and dissent about Oakley's
ability ever to support his children. Regardless of the reality of either side's position,
the majority focuses on Oakley's willful failure to support, suggesting that he could
have "decided" to take steps otherwise.
24.
25.
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scrutiny might apply. But, he explains, even if it does, it is satisfied
in this case.
From this position, Justice Wilcox moves to more secure
ground. Though he engages Oakley's position, he swiftly rejects
it. 31 The majority then shifts its focus to Oakley's position as a con
victed felon rather than as an ordinary citizen. It compares this
case to one from Oregon in which an intermediate appellate court
upheld a similar restriction imposed upon a convicted child
abuser. 32 In that case, "[t]he court rejected the defendant's argu
ment that strict scrutiny applied to the probation condition at is
sue."33 The Oakley court does as well. The majority explains that
incarceration, "by its very nature," deprives prisoners of numerous
fundamental rights, including the "right to be free from physical
restraint" and other rights implicated by such a broad scale re
straint, "such as the right to procreate."34 Therefore, explains the
court, convicted felons do not stand in the same position as free
people. 35 As a result, the majority determines that the appropriate
standard of review is that "conditions of probation may impinge
upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and
are reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation."36 Justice Wil
cox then speeds through the test, concluding that the condition im
posed is not overly broad. As suggested earlier in the decision,
Oakley's fundamental right to procreate is not extinguished. 37 He
can procreate, if he chooses, as soon as he makes "efforts" to sup
port his children. 38
Justice Wilcox next addresses the relationship between the
condition and an effort to rehabilitate Oakley. Justice Wilcox ex
plains that any alternative, such as allowing Oakley to have addi
tional children, would further victimize his existing children (and
31. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208 n.23 (holding "that probation conditions-like
prison regulations-are not subject to strict scrutiny analysis .... ").
32. Id. at 208 (citing State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)).
33. Id. at 209.
34. Id. at 210-12 (elaborating on all fundamental rights).
35. Id. at 210.
36. Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Wis. 1976)).
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212. There is a serious discrepancy here between the
court's language, which states that Oakley need only demonstrate that he is "making
efforts" to support his children and the language of the probation condition that re
quires him to "support his present and any future children." !d. (This discrepancy
seems to highlight the court's earlier suggestion that the reason the condition is nar
rowly tailored is because of the perceived safety valve-Oakley's choice to pay
support.)
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any future ones) and detract from efforts to conform Oakley's con
duct to a lawful obligation to support his children. 39 Oddly, though
he rejected a strict scrutiny test, Justice Wilcox speaks of the restric
tion as being "narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling in
terest"40 in rehabilitation even as he applies the reasonable
relationship test he has espoused.
In the end, Justice Wilcox seems to leave no real room for dis
pute about the analysis of this case, at least as to outcome. 41 Even
if one disagrees with the test being applied, a test of strictest scru
tiny does not change the result of the balancing in the majority's
view. Justice Wilcox asserts a low-level scrutiny test for probation
conditions, but, in an abundance of caution, also applies a high level
scrutiny.42 He demonstrates that regardless of which test applies, in
the end, the probation restriction survives. 43
Before analyzing the dissent's position, it bears mentioning
that the majority opinion is followed by two concurring opinions.
Closer scrutiny of the concurrences is warranted because it further
reveals that the real disagreement between the two sides is the out
come and not the constitutional approach. Neither concurrence
takes issue with Justice Wilcox' articulation of the appropriate de
gree of scrutiny imposed on probation conditions. In fact, Justice
Crooks' concurrence in part states his rejection of the strict scrutiny
standard: "[t]he appropriate test is not the strict scrutiny test .... "44
Interestingly, though, the rest of his concurrence focuses on the
compelling interest behind the probation restriction. As Justice
Crooks explains, "Oakley's nine children, rather than Oakley him
self, are the real victims in this case."45
Justice Bablitch's concurrence picks up the second part of a
strict scrutiny test: whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to
the governmental interest. Because he joined the court's articula
tion of the appropriate constitutional standard of review, Justice
Bablitch ignores the question of what scrutiny applies and focuses
on the factual difficulties presented by the case. 46 He restates that
there is a compelling governmental interest in preventing the harm
at 213.
at 212.
41.
at 208-14.
42.
at 207 (noting that "[wJhile the condition here survives strict scrutiny," it is
"not subject to strict scrutiny analysis ....").
43. Id.
44. Id. at 215 (Crooks, J., concurring).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 214 (Bablitch, J., concurring).
39.
40.

Id.
[d.
Id.
Id.
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to children who cannot otherwise protect themselves. 47 Ultimately,
despite his unhappiness with the results of the case, Justice Bab
litch's concurrence emphasizes the dissent's failure "to advance any
realistic alternative solution to what they concede is a compelling
state interest. "48 According to Justice Bablitch, the probation re
striction is narrowly tailored to the governmental interest because
no other restriction can be articulated which would achieve the
same degree of protection for Oakley's born, and potential unborn,
children.
In the end, it does not matter to the majority, including the
authors of the concurring opinions, which test applies. Under ei
ther a reasonable relationship or strict scrutiny test, the probation
condition survives. Although the majority spends a significant por
tion of the opinion criticizing the dissent's analysis of the applicable
standard, it is legal wrangling without a difference. 49 The outcome,
for the majority, is the same.

B.

The Dissents

There are two dissenting opinions. One was written by Justice
Bradley and joined by Justices Abrahamson and Sykes. The other
was written by Justice Sykes and joined by Justices Abrahamson
and Bradley. It is particularly notable that Justices Bradley and
Sikes joined each other's dissent though each seem to state a differ
ent standard of review for the probation condition. This proves one
point of this essay: regardless of the standard articulated, the real
disagreement between the majority and the dissent is the outcome,
not the degree of scrutiny.
Justice Bradley begins her dissent with blazing rhetoric. She
clearly takes offense at the majority's seeming disregard for the fun
damental right at issue in the case, the right to have children. She is
seriously alarmed that this type of case might set a precedent for
the curtailment of poor people's right to procreate. And, finally,
she emphasizes that though she has a substantive disagreement with
the majority, she is no less concerned than the four majority justices
about the protection of children. 50
47. Id. at 215.
48. Id. See also Richard P. Cole, Liberation and Empowerment: A Jubilean Alter
native for Wisconsin v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 27-28 (2004) (discussing

"Justice Bablitch's lamentation").
49. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205 n.18, 297-09 nn. 22-24 (using firm language to
describe the majority's view of the dissenting opinions).
50. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (indicating her concern "about children
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However, a technical look at Justice Bradley's opinion reveals
an interesting twist to the applicable scrutiny for probation condi
tions. She forthrightly states at the outset of her opinion that
"[b ]ecause the right implicated by the condition of probation in this
case is one that is central to the concept of fundamental liberty, the
state action infringing upon that right is subject to heightened scru
tiny."51 Because she has departed from the language of established
Wisconsin precedent on just this issue, Justice Bradley must explain
how she arrives at such a conclusion.
Justice Bradley examines the same language the majority cites
from the Edwards decision to illustrate the effect that probation
conditions may not be "overly broad" and must be "reasonably re
lated" to a probationer's rehabilitation. 52 Then she analyzes the ap
propriate standard of review for governmental conditions on liberty
interests in non-probation contexts. All would concede that, in
such a context, state action infringing on a fundamental liberty in
terest can be justified only by a compelling state interest and where
"narrowly drawn" to protect only those legitimate state interests at
stake. 53 Her next move is slightly tricky. At this point, Justice
Bradley equates a "means-ends inquiry" which is "not overly
broad" with one which must be "narrowly drawn."54 She concludes
"the essence of [either] inquiry is the same. "55
Unsurprisingly, the rest of her opinion focuses on the applica
tion of the relevant test; it concludes that the restriction is essen
tially a wholesale prohibition on Oakley's right to have children,
despite the safety valve the majority discussed. 56 In analyzing
whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to the government's in
terest in protecting children, Justice Bradley looks at alternatives
available to the state to achieve the same protective outcomes. She
explains that if that is government's true concern (as all of the court
seems to concede) then Wisconsin has a panoply of statutes availa
ble to ensure that goal. Included within the state's arsenal are wage
assignment and garnishment, liens on personal property, and civil
raised in poverty," Justice Bradley articulates that she too is "troubled by the societal
problem caused by 'deadbeat' parents ....").
51. Jd. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
52. Jd. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 111
(Wis. 1976».
53. Jd. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977».
54. Jd. at 217.
55. Jd.
56. Jd. at 217-18 (noting the circuit court's recognition of Oakley's inability to
fulfill the financial requirements of the condition).
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contempt. 57 Justice Bradley explains that at sentencing, Oakley
presented numerous alternative means of advancing the interests of
his children, including conditioning probation on his maintaining
two full-time jobs, supporting his children with the proceeds, taking
parenting classes, and undergoing drug and alcohol counseling. 58 In
the end, because there are less draconian means of achieving the
same ends, Justice Bradley finds the probation restriction cannot
survive constitutional scrutiny. 59
Justice Sykes basically agrees, as she must, given that she
joined Justice Bradley's opinion. She writes separately, it seems, to
underscore the point and identify several other means of securing
the same protections for Oakley's children that may be obtained
from the more restrictive probation condition. Doctrinally, how
ever, Justice Sykes' analysis is closer to that of the majority. She
agrees with the majority on the relevant degree of scrutiny of pro
bation conditions, and that infringements on a probationer's consti
tutional rights are "evaluated differently" from others.60 She
concedes that "conditions of probation may impinge upon constitu
tional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably
related to [the probationer's] rehabilitation."61 She does not ma
nipulate language to convert this into a strict scrutiny standard as
does Justice Bradley. Rather, she finds that the court-ordered pro
creation restriction is overly broad, cites many of the reasons
pointed to by Justice Bradley, and adds a few of her own. Justice
Sykes explains that in addition to being required to maintain two
jobs and face property liens, Oakley could have his tax refunds in
tercepted and redirected to child support and be criminally prose
cuted for any future failure to pay.62
Just as we learned from the three majority opinions, what we
learn from the interplay of these two dissenting justices is that it
does not matter which level of scrutiny applies. In the majority
view, regardless of the applicable level of scrutiny, the probation
57. !d. at 218 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90 (1978) (holding
unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute prohibiting marriage until both people had estab
lished that their child support obligations had been met».
58. Id. at 218 n.3. According to Justice Bradley, "at sentencing Oakley requested
an opportunity to maintain full employment, provide for his children, and make serious
payments towards his child support arrearages." Id.
59. Id. at 219.
60. !d. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
61. [d. (quoting Edwards v. State, 246 N.W. 2d 109 (Wis. 1976».
62. Id. at 222.
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condition stands. In the dissent's view, regardless of the applicable
level of scrutiny, the probation condition fails.
II.

SITUATING OAKLEY IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

If trends are defined by case outcomes, the Oakley decision

defies the overwhelmingly dominant trend in cases involving proba
tion restrictions on procreation. Of all reported cases challenging
procreation restrictions in a probation context, only one other deci
sion affirming the restrictions exists. 63 In the case of State v.
Kline,64 an Oregon intermediate appellate court upheld a probation
restriction imposed upon a defendant convicted of criminally mis
treating a child until he completed drug and anger management
counseling. 65 That case, upon which the Oakley majority heavily
relied in support of its application of rational basis review, is, as
characterized by the dissent, "a single appellate court case from the
state of Oregon .... "66
A.

The National Precedent Supports a Rule Striking Probation
Restrictions on Procreation

In at least eleven other reported cases, courts held procreation
restrictions to be void as inconsistent with constitutional rights of
privacy guaranteed by state and federal constitutions. 67 An analysis
63. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
64. 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
65. Id. at 699.
66. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 n.4 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
67. See U.S. v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) (procreation restriction
imposed on defendant convicted of heroin possession invalid); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (condition that defendant convicted for heroin
possession not become pregnant during probation invalid); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (procreation restriction imposed on defendant con
victed of child endangerment overly broad where less restrictive means existed to pro
vide safety for children); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293-94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (probation restriction that defendant convicted of robbery not become pregnant
unless married found void); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (condition that defendant convicted of grand theft and battery not become preg
nant during probation unless married invalid); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (condition prohibiting defendant from fathering a child not
reasonably related to crime of child abuse where other less restrictive means existed to
protect future children); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("no
pregnancy" condition for defendant convicted of battery of a two-month-old child
struck); Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (condition
prohibiting defendant convicted of child neglect from becoming pregnant while on pro
bation violated right of privacy); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989) (probation condition that defendant convicted of child endangerment refrain
from getting pregnant violated right to privacy); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952, 953
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of these opinions reveals little about the majority jurisprudential
position as to the degree of scrutiny applicable to probation restric
tions. As one commentator has said, "[t]he myriad of tests applied
is nothing short of a 'chaotic hodgepodge."'68 Moreover, there is
not even any textual support in Kline itself for the position the
Oakley majority takes as to the applicable degree of scrutiny. The
only conclusion to be drawn from the reported cases is that in the
overwhelming majority of cases, courts strike down probation re
strictions against procreation. One can derive no categorical rule
either as to the applicability of heightened review for probation
conditions or how good a predictor heightened review is as to case
outcome. 69
Ignoring these obvious conclusions to be drawn from the re
ported cases, the Oakley majority, with little or no empirical sup
port, derives an alternative meaning. The majority believes the
trend reflects the "lack of mettle" that criminal defendants have for
challenging probation restrictions given the "more punitive alterna
tive" they face to probation-incarceration. 70 Neither the dissent
nor this author is persuaded by the majority's conclusion.
The majority concludes that "the particular condition at issue
here," a prohibition against the defendant having more children, is
reserved for "the most egregious circumstances."71 A comparison
between Oakley, Kline, and those identified as part of the dominant
trend helps shed some light on the relative egregiousness of this
case as compared to others in which procreation restrictions have
been struck. In doing so, it reveals no direct correlation between
egregiousness and affirmation of probation conditions restrictive of
procreative ability. Such a comparison is also helpful in underscor
ing that the degree of scrutiny applied by courts is immaterial to the
outcome; and, the Justices' disagreement about the applicable level
of scrutiny in Oakley notwithstanding, the only assistance prece
dent provides in this area is the revelation of a majority position as
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (restriction that convicted forgery defendant may not "give birth to
any children outside of wedlock" during two year probationary period not reasonably
related to curtailing defendant's criminality); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1338
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (probation restriction that defendant who pled guilty to charge of
child abuse not have a child for five year period held unconstitutional).
68. Devon A. Corneal, Comment, Limiting the Right to Procreate: State v.Oakley
and the Need for Strict Scrutiny of Probation Conditions, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 447,
464 (2003) (citation omitted).
69. See infra Part I1.c.
70. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 209 n.24.
71. Id.
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to outcome, not analysis. 72
The factual backdrop grounding the comparison is, of course,
Oakley itself. Recall that Oakley was charged with violating a Wis
consin statute that makes it a felony to refuse to support one's chil
dren. In response to the crisis children face as a result of non
custodial parents' refusal to pay child support, Wisconsin passed a
law imposing severe criminal sanctions on so-called "deadbeat par
ents."73 Section 939.50(3)(e) makes it a class E felony for any per
son who "intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to
provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the person
knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to
provide ...." The sentence for violation of the provision is a fine
not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment of up to two years, or both.
In the case of intentional refusal to pay, imprisonment can be for up
to five years,?4
B.

The Case for Upholding Restrictions on Procreation

The only other case in which a probation restriction on procre
ation was upheld involved a father convicted of serious physical
abuse of his children. 75 The facts of the case are easily character
ized as "egregious." The defendant in the case, Tad Kline, regularly
abused his son until his parental rights were eventually terminated.
After the termination of his parental rights to his son, Kline abused
72. This conclusion should not be surprising given a trend in federal and state
constitutional jurisprudence away from an older presumption that the degree of scru
tiny is outcome determinative. For example, it used to be presumed that nearly without
exception, strict scrutiny meant a law based on governmental classification could not
survive and that rational (or reasonable) basis scrutiny meant doom for a challenge to a
law that reflected a particular classification. Recent case law suggests otherwise. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (race-based admissions criterion survive strict
scrutiny); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking sodomy laws without explicit
mention of fundamental right or strict scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(striking a sexual orientation classification despite no mention of strict scrutiny); Good
ridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (a state-level decision deter
mining that rational basis means real scrutiny). An in-depth discussion of this recent
jurisprudential shift is beyond the scope of this essay but has been taken up insightfully
elsewhere. Compare Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,8 (1972)
(characterizing the Warren Court's strict scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact ..."), with Libby Huskey, Case Note, Constitutional Law-Affirmative Action in
Higher Education-Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325 (2003), 4 WYOMING L. REv. 439, 442 (2004) (describing the "weakening [of]
the strict scrutiny test. ").
73. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d. at 203.
74. WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(e) (1999-2000).
75. See State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
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a daughter later born to him and his wife. His abuse of his daughter
resulted in a spiral fracture to her leg as well as bruising to her chest
and back when she was just eleven months 01d. 76 Kline testified
that he had harmed his daughter because he did not know his own
strength and stated that his conduct resulted from the fact that "ba
bies are so hard to understand. "77 He was convicted of criminal
mistreatment of children and, as a condition of his probation, re
quired to complete a drug and anger management program.78 As a
further condition of probation, the court required him to obtain
written approval of having met these underlying requirements
before fathering any additional children. 79
Kline challenged the restriction on his procreative ability as vi
olative of his fundamental right to procreate. 80 The Oregon court
disagreed. Confirming the analysis of the trial court, the appeals
court explained that in light of the defendant's background and the
appropriate interest in the safety of any children the defendant
might conceive in the future, the condition could withstand consti
tutional scrutiny.81 In so holding, the court emphasized that the re
striction was not a total ban because it could be modified or
eliminated simply on the defendant's demonstration that he had
completed treatment. On balance, the court said the "condition
provides potential victims with protection from future injury and
interferes with defendant's fundamental rights to a permissible
degree."82
Interestingly, the Oakley court focuses on Kline to determine
the degree of scrutiny to be applied even though the Kline decision
reveals very little as to the degree of scrutiny imposed. The deci
sion reflects that Kline argued for strict scrutiny, conceding that the
state interest in protecting children is compelling, but contesting
that the infringement was not "narrowly tailored to achieve the
state's legitimate goals."83 The Oakley court states that the Kline
court "rejected the defendant's argument that strict scrutiny ap
plied ...."84 Yet, a search of the Kline decision reveals no clear
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 209 (Wis. 2001).

96

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:81

rejection of the defendant's argument as to anything except
outcome.
While the Kline court did say it disagreed with the defendant's
position, it is not clear that the point it disagreed with is the applica
ble level of scrutiny. The Kline court disagreed with defendant's
argument that "the court was required to perform a less restrictive
means analysis before imposing the condition, that it failed to do so,
and that the record does not support the imposition of such a condi
tion."85 The analysis that follows the rejection of the defendant's
position does not reveal whether the court disagreed that it was re
quired to perform a less restrictive means analysis (which would be
required to support the Oakley majority's characterization of the
Kline decision), whether the court disagreed that the lower court
failed to do the less restrictive means analysis, or whether the court
disagreed that the record did not support imposition of the condi
tion. In other words, the analysis does not reveal whether the court
rejected the defendant's argument for strict scrutiny, or whether it
accepted it but concluded that the probation condition passed con
stitutional muster even under that heightened standard. In sum,
there is no way to determine from its language what degree of scru
tiny the Kline court imposed. 86 In the end, as with the Oakley case,
it does not matter. The outcome in both cases could be supported
by application of either a strict scrutiny or reasonable basis test.
C.

The Case Against Upholding Restrictions on Procreation

Obviously, the Kline facts are egregious. And, if egregiousness
of facts were the test for reviewing procreation restrictions, one
could understand how that might distinguish outcomes in Kline and
the case of People v. Zaring,87 for example, in which a California
court struck a procreation restriction imposed on a heroin abuser.
However, cases striking procreation restrictions in the probation
context are not without egregious facts comparable to those present
in Kline. Admitting that there is no precise egregiousness measure,
85. Kline, 963 P.2d at 699.
86. Indeed, the one citation the Kline court cited as controlling supports Defen
dant's claim for heightened scrutiny. Id. (citing State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 540 (Or.
1978) ("when fundamental right is involved, sentencing court has less discretion to im
pose conditions in conflict with the right")).
87. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding "no pregnancy condi
tion ... improper because it is impermissibly overbroad.").
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it is nonetheless hard to argue that the facts of People v. Pointer 88
are not similarly egregious as those in KLine. Pointer involved a
challenge to a probation restriction waged by a mother of two in
fant children who was convicted of felony endangerment. Against
the advice of her physician and over the objections of one of the
children's father, Ruby Pointer imposed a strict macrobiotic diet re
gime on her children. Over time, the children suffered severe phys
ical consequences as a result of the food restrictions. 89 When
Pointer finally brought one of her children to a doctor, he was diag
nosed as "emaciated, semi-comatose, and in a state of shock, was
dying and in need of immediate hospitalization."90 Pointer re
sponded, in effect, that she would think about it. She "resisted hos
pitalization because she felt [her son] might intravenously be fed
'preservatives' and suffer a rash."91 The doctor who had first diag
nosed her son contacted officials who ordered the child hospitalized
immediately. Even during her son's hospitalization, Pointer contin
ued to feed him macrobiotic food despite her doctor's warnings not
to do so. She also continued to breastfeed her son after being told
not to because her milk contained dangerously high levels of so
dium for the child. 92
Once discharged from the hospital, Pointer's son was placed in
a foster home. During an otherwise lawful visit with her son,
Pointer abducted him and fled to Puerto Rico. 93 After her eventual
arrest in Puerto Rico, she admitted to having abducted her son
from the foster home. She justified the kidnapping by explaining
that the foster parent fed her son "eggs and sugar and did not re
spect his dietary habits."94 She said the child was "getting fat" and
88. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the existence of "alterna
tive restrictions less subversive of appellant's fundamental right to procreate.").
89. Id. at 359-60.
A [macrobiotic] diet is followed for spiritual and philosophical reasons. [The
diet] [a]ims to maintain a balance between foods seen as ying (positive) or
yang (negative). The diet progresses through ten levels, becoming increasingly
restrictive. Not all levels are vegetarian, though each level gradually elimi
nates animal products. The highest levels eliminate fruit and vegetables, even
tually reaching the level of a brown rice diet.
The Fruitarian Found., Definitions of Nutrition Systems at www.fruitarian.comiayIDefi
nitionsNutritionSystems.htm (last visited july. 21, 2004).
90. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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that "she did not like it. "95 As a result of the diet and Pointer's
neglect, both of her children suffered physical damage including
"severe growth retardation and permanent neurological damage."96
Ruby Pointer was convicted of felony child endangerment under a
statute similar to the one under which Kline was charged. The
court sentenced her to five years probation on certain conditions
including that she not conceive any children within the probation
ary period. 97
Expressing deep understanding of the trial court's motivation
behind imposing the condition, nevertheless, the appellate court
struck the condition. 98 After concluding first that the procreation
restriction was reasonable in light of Pointer's history of child abuse
and endangerment, the court focused on the range of options avail
able to protect future unborn children. 99 The court concluded that
"less onerous conditions" could adequately serve the intended pur
pose of the restriction-protecting the public, including preventing
injury to any future unborn children. loo The court suggested that
the defendant could submit to pregnancy testing, and if she became
pregnant could "be required to follow an intensive prenatal and
neonatal treatment program monitored by both the probation of
ficer and by a supervising physician. "101 The court further pointed
out that any child born during the probationary period could be
removed from her custody and placed in foster care. Interestingly,
and arguably inconsistent with the legal conclusion it draws, the
court pointed out these alternative conditions despite its acknowl
edgement that "the record fully supports the trial court's belief that
appellant would continue to adhere to a strict macrobiotic diet de
spite the dangers it presents to any children she might conceive,"
and the potential for irrevocable harm to a future child despite later
intervention by the state. 102
Understandably, the Oakley majority ignored the Pointer case
not just because of its outcome but likely also because of its clear
articulation of the applicable test for reviewing probation restric
tions that implicate fundamental rights. Although the Pointer court
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366.
99. Id. at 365.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 364.
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explained that "[t]he validity of the condition of probation ... must
first be assessed in terms of its reasonableness,"103 it emphasized
that satisfaction of a reasonableness standard did not end the in
quiry. In circumstances where a probation condition "impinges
upon the exercise of a fundamental right," the court said it "must
additionally determine whether the condition is impermissibly over
broad. "104 Resolving any ambiguity about the applicable level of
review resulting from the "impermissibly overbroad" language, the
court explained that, in light of the infringement the condition
placed on the defendant's fundamental right to privacy, it must be
subjected to "special scrutiny" to determine whether it is "entirely
necessary" to serve "the purposes of rehabilitation and public
safety."105 In the end, in light of the availability of less restrictive
alternatives, the Pointer court unanimously reversed the part of the
trial court's judgment prohibiting procreation as a probation condi
tion. Although it never used the language of strict scrutiny, leaving
some question as to the applicable level of inquiry and some room
for the debate engaged in by the Oakley justices as to the meaning
of "overly broad," the outcome is without doubt. As long as there
is any possible alternative (even one that is arguably not failsafe) 106
available for protecting future children, a procreation restriction, no
matter how egregious the facts of the case, must fall in the eyes of
the California court.
A case also involving child abuse, decided nearly seventeen
years after Pointer, applied a low level of scrutiny yet concurred
with the outcome in Pointer.1 07 InState v. Trammell, the defendant
was charged and convicted of neglect of a dependent following her
son's death from malnutrition and dehydration.1 08 The facts of the
case are, arguably, egregious. Kristie Trammell's son was consum
ing reasonable amounts of formula but vomiting and suffering from
severe diarrhea for several months.109 Trammell, without any re
103. Id. at 363.
104. Id. at 364.
105. [d. at 365. This characterization of the level of scrutiny as "special" tracks
black letter law as defined in LAFAVE, ISRAEL, AND KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
§ 26.9(a), 834. Departing, though, somewhat from the Pointer articulation of special
scrutiny, LaFave et. al define this special scrutiny to mean a condition is impermissible
if "the impact upon the probationer's rights is 'substantially greater than is necessary to
carry out the purposes' of probation." /d.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
107. State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
108. Id. at 285-86.
109. [d. at 285.
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ported explanation, ignored her mother's direction to take the child
to a hospital for care. 110 The record showed that on the day the
child died, Trammell fed the child once shortly after midnight
whereupon he vomited most of what he consumed. 111 Except for
peeking into his room the next morning, Trammell failed to either
check on or feed the child until the next evening. 112 By that time,
he had been dead for hours.1 13 The facts demonstrate that the child
had been starving for a long period of time, weighing less than ten
pounds when he was almost five months 01d. 114 At Trammell's sen
tencing for the charge of neglect, the trial court gave her an eigh
teen year sentence with eight years to be served on probation. 115
One of the conditions of her probation was that she not become
pregnant. 116
In reviewing a challenge to the probation condition, the Indi
ana court addressed the issue as one of first impression in the state
court. The applicable test articulated by the court for review of
probation conditions that impinge upon a probationer's exercise of
a constitutional right was one of reasonableness. In the court's
words, "the condition must 'have a reasonable relationship to the
treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.' "117 The
court created a balancing test for instances when a probation condi
tion intrudes on a constitutional right by taking into account: "(1)
the purpose sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to
which constitutional rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should
be afforded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law
enforcement."118 Nowhere does the opinion refer to strict scrutiny
or heightened review. Interestingly, the Trammell court pointed to
the Pointer analysis without adopting the same degree of scrutiny.
The Trammell court was persuaded that the restriction had no rela
tionship to rehabilitation. 119 They also felt that the condition would
give rise to significant enforcement problems by forcing Trammell
110.

111.
112.

113.
114.

115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 286.

at 287.
at 286.
at 288 (quoting Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App.

1999)).
118.
119.

1984)).

Id.
Id. at 288-89 (citing People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App.
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to choose among concealing the pregnancy, abortion, or incarcera
tion.120 Based on these two factors, the Indiana Court struck the
condi tion. 121
In the end, a comparison of cases provides no support for the
Oakley majority's conclusion either that the applicable test is one of
reasonableness (or, alternately stated, not strict scrutiny) or egre
giousness of facts. As demonstrated above, the opinions inter
changeably talk of reasonableness, special, and strict scrutiny. At
least one case using the language of reasonableness struck a proba
tion condition. 122 Another court, arguably accepting a defendant's
argument for strict scrutiny, upheld a similar condition.123 Many of
the cases involve egregious facts, including demonstrated harm to
children. Neither the level of scrutiny applied nor the egregious
ness of facts is predictive of outcomes. Looking to precedent, the
only reliable prediction that can be made is that, in the vast major
ity of cases, restrictions on procreation as a condition of probation
fail. Oakley and Kline are exceptions proving an otherwise hard,
fast, longstanding rule - a rule as to outcome.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE RULE-UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

Despite the existence of a hard and fast rule as to outcome, the
Wisconsin court did not hold to it. The court had an obligation only
to identify the legal rule applicable to probation conditions and ap
ply it to the facts before it.124 Whether applying a strict scrutiny,
special scrutiny, or rational basis test, the court was charged with
weighing the degree to which the probation restriction impinged on
a fundamental right against the asserted state interest. It did so du
tifully. Despite the court's faithfulness to its duty, the dissenting
justices, and this author, remain unsettled by the outcome-both by
the serious departure from established case law, at least as to out
120. Id. at 290 (citing State v. Mosburg, 768P.2d 313 (1989». See Jennifer Martin,
Coercive Abortions and Criminalizing the Birth of Children: Some Thoughts on the Im
pact on Women of State v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65 (2004).
121. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 290-91.
122. Id. at 291.
123.
tion that
daughter,
ment and
124.

State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a condi
the defendant, convicted of mistreating and physically abusing an infant
refrain from fathering additional children before completing anger manage
drug treatment programs).
Elizabeth F. McCright, Prohibiting Deadbeat Dads From Fathering More
Children . .. What's Next? The Wisconsin Supreme Court's Decision in State v. Oakley,
86 MARQ. L. REV. 153,165 (2002).
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come, and by the implications for poor people's fundamental right
to have children.
One other reason the outcome of Oakley is so unsettling is the
extent to which it conflicts with established law as to the degree of
protection for the fundamental rights of incarcerated felons, a con
dition which David Oakley avoided by probation. Oakley stands in
stark contrast to Turner v. Safley,125 in which the United States Su
preme Court affirmed that incarcerated prisoners may not be de
nied the fundamental right to marry.126 In Turner, the Court
considered a challenge brought by a class of incarcerated prisoners
to a Missouri regulation that denied prisoners the right to marry
without the approval of the superintendent which would be ordina
rily withheld absent a compelling reason.127 In analyzing the re
striction, the Court acknowledged that the right to marry is a
fundamental one. It further acknowledged that, "[p ]rison walls do
not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of
the Constitution. "128 Granting that, "the problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable," and that "courts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform,"129 the Court identified a unique test
for balancing the constitutional rights of prisoners with the adminis
trative exigencies of running a prison. The test it formulated was
not a standard of heightened scrutiny, but "instead inquired
whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is 'rea
sonably related' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it
represents an 'exaggerated response' to those concerns."130 Con
cluding that the marriage restriction in the case was the latter, it
struck the provision. Notably, in Turner, a restriction on a funda
mental right fell under a test applying the lowest degree of
scrutiny.131
A second fundamental rights case implicated by the Oakley de
125. 482 u.S. 78 (1987).
126. Id. at 96.
127. Id. at 82. While not contained within the regulation, Missouri officials testi
fied that "generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would be
considered a compelling reason." [d. Absent such a scenario, ordinarily, no prisoner
could marry. Id.
128. [d. at 84.
129. [d. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,404-05 (1974».
130. [d. at 87
131. [d. at 89 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119,
128 (1977» (noting "such a standard is necessary if 'prison administrators ... , and not
the courts [are] to make difficult the judgments concerning institutional operations'.").
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clslOn is that of Zablocki v. Redhaif.1 32 In Zablocki, the United
State Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin ban on marriage im
posed on a father who was not up-to-date on child support where
his children's caretaker was on public assistance. As the Court ex
plained, a statutory prohibition on the right to marry could not be
justified by the state's interest in providing support for children. 133
Together, what Zablocki and Turner mean for David Oakley is that
he could not have been denied his fundamental right to marry,
whether he was in jailor not, as a result of his failure to pay child
support. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to learn that, as a
probationer, he could be denied the equally fundamental right of
procreation.
The Oakley majority ignores the jurisprudential result of the
confluence of Turner and Zablocki.13 4 Instead it takes an alterna
tive approach to the deprivation of David Oakley'S fundamental
right to procreate. Justice Wilcox explains that, "[ slimply stated,
[the trial judge] preserved much of Oakley's liberty by imposing
probation with conditions rather than the more punitive option of
imprisonment."135 Put another way, since the trial judge could have
sentenced Oakley to prison, a near total curtailment of his liberty
interests, he surely could impose upon him a less restrictive result
no incarceration but a "voluntary"136 restriction on a liberty inter
est less severe than that which might have resulted upon incarcera
tion. Explained this way, an unconstitutional conditions problem
with the probation condition becomes obvious.
132. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
133. Id. at 389-90.
134. The majority does not exactly ignore Zablocki as it does Turner. However,
it seriously minimizes its significance, noting that while its facts are interesting because
it was a Wisconsin case, it is inapposite because the Court applied strict scrutiny. State
v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208 n.23 (Wis. 2001).
135. Id. at 212-13.
136. The word voluntary is in quotes to highlight the fact that in choosing proba
tion and voluntarily accepting the conditions that attach, convicted defendants have
very little real choice in the matter. See U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (gov
ernment argued that probation condition allowing warrantless and limitless searches of
probationer was voluntary because probationer "had the option of rejecting probation
and going to prison instead"). See also Sunny A. M. Koshy, Note, The Right of [All] the
People to Be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationers
and Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449, 466-68 (1988) (questioning the "voluntariness" of
probationers' and parolees' choice considering that the alternative is incarceration); PA·
TRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFES.
SOR 33-35 (1991) (discussing the voluntary choice of a black South Carolina man to be
castrated in exchange for a commutation of his prison sentence) (citing State v. Brown,
326 S.E. 2d 410 (S.c. 1985».
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Stated broadly, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine "pro
hibits conditions on allocations in which the government indirectly
impinges on a protected activity or choice in a way that would be
unconstitutional if the same result had been achieved through a di
rect governmental command."137 Although until recently its vital
ity has been in some question in the area of governmental
benefits,138 there is no real question about the unconstitutional con
ditions doctrine's relevance and life in the area of probation condi
tions. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court considered
a challenge to a probation condition by which the probationer
agreed to "[s]ubrnit his . . . person, property, place of residence,
vehicle, [and] personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without
a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any pro
bation officer or law enforcement officer."139 As the Court notes,
the government conceded that the unconstitutional conditions doc
trine applied.1 40 As the government explained in its brief, "[u]nder
the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the gov
ernment may not require a person to give up a constitutional right
in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the govern
ment ...."141 What the doctrine means for Oakley is that to the
extent probation may be viewed as a governmental allocation or
"benefit," the government may not condition it on Oakley's giving
up his right to procreation, voluntary or otherwise. Viewed this
way, the condition clearly fails.
137. There are numerous articulations of the doctrine. This one comes from Lynn
A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Condi
tions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1193-94 (1990). The foundational article on the topic
is considered to be Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413 (1989). Other authors have also expounded on and criticized the doctrine in

numerous contexts. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term 
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209 (1989); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
138. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine suffered a decline after Rust v. Sul
livan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in which the Court limited the reach of the doctrine in pro
grams funding governmental speech. Despite the Court's limitation on the doctrine set
in Rust, it was revitalized after the 2001 Term in which the Court applied the doctrine to
the legal services program in Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (2001). In
that case, the Court held unconstitutional a restriction on legal services aid recipients'
use of aid to attempt to amend or challenge welfare laws. Id. at 548-49.
139. U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,114 (2001).
140. Id. at 118 n.4.
141. Brief for the Petitioner at 21-22, U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No.
00-1260), available at 2001 WL 799254 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
385 (1994)).

2004]

PROBATION RESTRICTIONS IMPACTING PROCREATION

105

Arguably, Wisconsin could respond that the correct compari
son is not whether the government could have deprived Oakley of
the right to procreate ifhe were a free man, but rather, whether the
government could have deprived Oakley of the right to have chil
dren if he were incarcerated. However, this position goes against
the great weight of unconstitutional conditions cases, of which there
are admittedly few, in the probation context.1 42 Moreover, it is in
consistent with the general approach of the part of the doctrine that
explains that simply because government can through one action
restrict a liberty interest of an individual, it does not mean it can
automatically do so in a different context just because the govern
mental largess being offered in the second scenario can be catego
rized somehow as lesser. As Kathleen Sullivan has explained, the
unconstitutional conditions problem implicates the question
whether the "greater power to deny a benefit [in Oakley's case pro
bation] includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its
receipt. "143
Nevertheless, taking the point on directly arguendo, reveals the
serious flaw in the Oakley outcome. Even if Wisconsin could be
heard to argue that the correct point of comparison is whether the
government could restrict Oakley's right to procreate as an incar
cerated felon, the restriction on Oakley's right to procreate, without
the legitimate penological concerns that arise in a prison context,
would still fail.
In Goodwin v. Turner,144 inmate Steven Goodwin requested
authorization from prison officials to ejaculate into a container so
that his semen could be used to impregnate his wife artificially.1 45
142. See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 118; U.S. v. Cranley, 350 F.3d 617, 620-22 (7th
Cir. 2003) (no unconstitutional conditions problem where probationer required to give
full accounting of his criminal activity as condition of probation); U.S. v. Jimenez, 600
F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1979) (unconstitutional condition of probation to require re
payment of cost of appointed counsel where no exception for indigence); State v. Ec
cles, 877 P.2d 779, 800-02 (Ariz. 1994) (unconstitutional to require waiver of Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as condition of probation); State v.
Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Minn. 2000) (geographical exclusion held invalid under
unconstitutional conditions review).
143. Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1415. As many commentators have explained,
this "greater includes the lesser" argument has run headlong into unconstitutional con
ditions creating a confusing mix of case law. See, e.g., Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconsti
tutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV.
371, 374 (1995) (noting that "[t]he problem of conditioned benefits is 'the basic struc
tural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled court and commentators.''')
(citation omitted).
144. 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
145. Id. at 1396.

106

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:81

Goodwin and his wife were concerned that if they were forced to
wait until Goodwin's release date to begin to have children, they
would be at an increased risk for giving birth to a child with birth
defects "as a result of increased maternal age."146 Officials denied
the request. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial
of the inmate's request for relief. 147 Despite this outcome, the
court's analysis is informative for purposes of evaluating an uncon
stitutional conditions argument on behalf of Oakley.
In Goodwin, the Eighth Circuit assumed that Goodwin's right
to procreate survives incarceration.1 48 The standard for evaluating
the prison restriction on a prisoner's fundamental right, explained
the court, is "to ask whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.' "149 Finding that there were legiti
mate penological interests that might be undermined by allowing
male prisoners to procreate while in prison, the court upheld the
restriction. ISO Although this outcome reveals the compromised na
ture of the constitutional right to procreate while one is incarcer
ated, the applicable rule reveals the limitations on the compromise.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1400.
148. The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach. See Gerber v. Hickman,
291 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (right to procreate does not survive incarcer
ation) rev'g 264 F.3d 882. The Ninth Circuit panel decision affirming the inmate's right
to procreate engendered a significant amount of scholarship, most of which argued that
the decision was correctly decided and reversed the previous trend of striking prison
regulations restricting the right of inmates to procreate as supported by legitimate pe
nological interests. See, e.g., Jaime Escuder, Comment, Prisoner Parents: An Argument
for Extending the Right to Procreate to Incarcerated Men and Women, 2002 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 271 (2002); Richard Guidice, Jr., Note, Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the
Right to Procreate Survive Incarceration and do Legitimate Penological Interests Justify
Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2277 (2002).
149. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1398 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223
(1990».
150. Oddly, the legitimate penological interest that supported the restriction in
the court's eyes was rooted in gender equity. The Eighth Circuit explained that if male
prisoners' rights to procreate were protected, female prisoners' rights would also have
to be. That would result in hardship for the prison because the method for protecting
the procreative right would be so different, and labor intensive, in the instance of fe
male prisoners. Id. at 1400. Evaluating the strength of the court's reasoning is beyond
the scope of this essay. However, this author questions the legitimacy of the prison
officials' concerns given the gender inequities in prison See, e.g., Voncile B. Gowdy,
Women in Criminal Justice: A Twenty Year Update, available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/re
ports/98Guides/wcjs98/execsumm.htm (last visited July 21, 2004) (noting that the "in
crease in the number of female offenders has not been matched by enhanced attention
to specialized programs geared particularly for women - such as medical care and coun
seling for prior victimization from battering or sexual assault, health care, drug treat
ment, and parenting skills training.")
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That is, in order to justify the restriction on even a prisoner's consti
tutional right to procreate, a prison must demonstrate that legiti
mate penological interests support the restriction. Those
penological interests that justify the restriction in the prison context
simply do not transfer to the probationer context. Therefore, tak
ing away legitimate prison-based penological interests from the
analysis, a prisoner ends up with more rights than David Oakley
does as a probationer.
Deprived of the fundamental right to procreate solely because
he is a probationer, Oakley ultimately enjoys fewer protections
than he would as an incarcerated felon. Both logic and the uncon
stitutional conditions doctrine decry this result. While it is true, as
the Oakley court recognized, that Oakley might, as a practical mat
ter, be deprived the right to procreate had the court simply sen
tenced him to prison, that does not mean that he would have no
legal recourse to challenge such a restriction on a fundamental lib
erty and privacy interest. Nor does it mean, as a doctrinal matter,
that the state could condition the benefit-probation as an alterna
tive to incarceration - on his voluntary agreement to relinquish a
constitutional right.
CONCLUSION

David Oakley did a bad thing. He should have financially sup
ported his children. Few people, and certainly not this author,
would quarrel with the Oakley court's concern for the welfare of
children. lsl On the level of doctrine, the court balanced the com
peting concerns and ruled that the state's interest in protecting chil
dren defeated Oakley's right to procreate. The court acted in its
traditional capacity and applied a straightforward rule of law. De
spite that, the result conflicts with nearly all reported decisions in
volving analogous facts. No matter, that is the messy business of
judicial balancing.
Of greater concern, however, is that in the end, the result puts
Oakley in a worse position with respect to his right to procreate
than he would have been in had he been ordered to the more se
vere punishment, incarceration rather than probation. Moreover,
the court justified the incursion on Oakley's constitutional right on
the fact that he received the governmental benefit of probation.
The precedent this sets threatens to undermine the constitutional
151. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Wis. 2001) (describing the "effects of
the nonpayment of child support on our children" as "particularly troubling.").
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rights of marginalized people, including the poor and racial minori
ties. 152 In the end, society is harmed when constitutional rights are
denied or conditioned on benefits. While the case may result in
some ephemeral protections for David Oakley's yet unborn or,
more likely, never-to-be-born children, the risk of harm to the con
stitutionalliberties of existing citizens is far greater than that posed
to potential ones.

152. See Albiston & Neilson, supra note 14; Ballard, supra note 8,
supra note 136.
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